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ZU ZA N N A  SZATAN IK
University of Silesia
Photographic Transgressions 
in Carol Shields’s “Scenes”
Ab s t r a c t : The general aim o f this article is to discuss ways in which an acclaimed Canadian 
writer, Carol Shields, employs, and simultaneously subverts, photographic metaphors in her 
short story titled “Scenes.” Shields skillfully arranges a series o f scenes from Frances’s —  
the protagonist’s —  past into a concise biography. Owing to their affinity to photographs, 
the scenes from Frances’s life might be attributed the status o f objective and honest rep­
resentations of reality which function as truthful evidence of what happened. Importantly, 
however, while Shields’s story evokes the photographic associations, it simultaneously calls 
in question their documentary reliability. In other words, Frances’s fragmentary biography 
—  shown in (verbally constructed) images or flashes —  undermines the concepts o f both, 
a photograph as a documentary inscription o f the truth, and language as a fitting medium 
of describing this truth.
K e y  w o r d s : Photography, representation, biography, language.
The general aim of this article is to discuss ways in which an acclaimed 
Canadian writer, Carol Shields, employs, and simultaneously subverts, pho­
tographic metaphors in her short story titled “Scenes.” It is easy to ob­
serve that Shields skillfully arranges a series of scenes from her protago­
nist’s (Frances’s) past into a concise biography. These scenes — apparently 
insignificant, uncalculated and combined into a narrative in a seeming­
ly accidental manner — “are much too fragmentary to be stories and far 
too immediate to be memories” (Sh ie l d s , C., 1990 : 655); indeed, the act 
of reading Shields’s text resembles that of going through a random collec­
tion of photographs. It is in the final part of Shields’s text that the nar­
rator explains the nature of scenes which
[...] seem to bloom out o f nothing, out o f the thin, uncoloured air of de­
feats and pleasures. A  curtain opens, a light appears, there are voices or 
music or sometimes a wide transparent stream of silence. Only rarely do 
they point to anything but themselves. They’re useless, attached to no­
thing, can’t be traded in or shaped into instruments to prise open the 
meaning o f the universe.
Sh i e l d s , C., 1990 : 655
In subsequent paragraphs, the scenes are compared to ornaments, to 
keys that open nothing, and to colorful Easter eggs. On the one hand, the 
comparisons emphasize the trivial nature of the scenes: they are decorative 
but — like the Easter eggs “with a hole poked in the top and bottom and 
the contents blown out” (Sh ie l d s , C., 1990 : 655) —  empty; they are insub­
stantial and linked with reality in a vague, uncanny manner. On the oth­
er hand, however, the narrator admits that “they are what a life is made 
of, one fitting against the next like English paving stones” (Sh ie l d s , C., 
1990 : 655). By means of combining the concepts of light, transparency 
and emptiness with one of stability and durability ( “paving stones”), the 
narrator avoids unequivocal categorization of scenes. Like photographs, 
they are and are not the inscriptions of reality; they are subjective (in the 
sense that they are pictured by a third party) but still manage to present 
a number of facts. Moreover, most obviously, they are what the story of 
Frances’s life — the only one there is — is composed of. This fragmentary 
biography indirectly expresses the “need for a continued assertion of [pho­
tographic/biographical] referential power” (H a v e r t y  Ru g g , L., 1997 : 10) —  
or insists on “coming to grips with the self in the world” (Ha v e r t y  Ru g g , 
L., 1997 : 11) — and, simultaneously, unveils this self as (mis)constructed 
and proliferated by means of photographic and verbal representations.
Traditionally, photography has been perceived as “truer than other rep­
resentative images” (H a v e r t y  Ru g g , L., 1997 : 12). Owing to their affinity 
to photographs, the scenes from Frances’s life might, therefore, be attri­
buted the status of objective and honest representations of reality which 
function as truthful evidence of what happened. Importantly, however, 
while Shields’s story evokes photographic associations, it simultaneously 
calls in question documentary reliability. In other words, Frances’s frag­
mentary biography —  shown in (verbally constructed) images (or flash­
es) — undermines the concepts of both, a photograph as a “transparent 
window onto truth” (Be s t , V, 1997 : 174), and language as a fitting me­
dium of describing this truth.
Therefore, my article focuses on how Shields relates to the “prob­
lem of referring to the self in language and in image” (Ha v e r t y  Ru g g , L., 
1997 : 2), or — more specifically, on how she unveils photography, as well
as language, as dubious tools of narrating the protagonist’s experience. 
The paper starts with a brief introduction to the theory of photography. 
Next, it proceeds to the analysis of selected scenes, focusing first on the 
notion of the mirror image, then on the juxtaposition of photographic fi­
xedness with movement, and, finally, on language as the system of rep­
resentation. I assume, following Linda Haverty Rugg, that “it is precise­
ly the absence of real photographs [in Shields’s short-story] and the use 
of the photographic metaphor that lead [one] to question the ideology of 
photography” (H a v e r t y  Ru g g , L., 1997 : 7). In Shields’s biographical nar­
rative, photography becomes the metaphor for memory and history which 
is always fragmented, subjective, unreliable and storied.
Even though, since the mid-1800s, the seemingly honest nature of pho­
tography has been questioned, more recently and most famously in Susan 
Sontag’s On Photography and, at least partly, in Camera Lucida. Reflec­
tions on Photography by Roland Barthes, it still “offers a way of seeing 
that is deceptively simple, presenting an image so easily recognizable, and 
so obviously referential that it offers the viewer a relation to the photo­
graphed subject that feels like knowledge” (Be s t , V, 1997 : 173). What Vic­
toria Best calls the “there-ness” of the photograph (Be s t , V, 1997 : 174) 
— understood as its fixedness in a specific moment in time and in a cha­
racteristic space — creates the illusion of presence and authenticity. The 
photographed subject appears to be more real and more embodied than 
the one who has been represented in a painting or described by means of 
words. According to Linda Hutcheon, “Photographs are said to carry their 
referent within themselves: there is a necessarily real thing which was 
once placed before the lens” (Hu t c h e o n , L., 2002 : 87). Due to this “myth 
of photographic truth” (St u r k e n , M., 2001 : 17) and its relation to corpo­
reality, photography has been linked to the concept of the body; viewed as 
evidence of the past, it has also been connected with the notion of memo­
ry, and — consequently — of history, biography, and autobiography.
However, what interests me most in regard to Shields’s short story, 
is the relationship between photography and the (gendered) body, as well 
as what I call photographic incongruity which stems from the fact that 
as much as photographs appear to be real, objective, and compatible with 
the photographed subject, they are, in fact, a site of a curious tension be­
tween reality and image, subjectivity and objectivity, presence and absence. 
As Hutcheon remarks:
Commentators as diverse as Annette Kuhn, Susan Sontag, and Roland
Barthes have remarked on photography’s ambivalences: it is in no way
innocent o f cultural formation (or innocent o f forming culture) yet it is
in a very real sense technically tied to the real, or at least to the visual 
and the actual.
Hu t c h e o n , L., 2002 : 42
Indeed, “the photograph cannot be taken as a simple illustration of 
what was once there before the lens” (Be s t , V, 1997 : 175). For instance, 
“no matter what social role an image plays, the creation o f an image 
through a camera lens always involves some degree of subjective choice” 
(St u r k e n , M., Ca r t w r ig h t , L., 2001 : 16). As a paradoxical medium, photog­
raphy is, in Hutcheon’s terms, a “perfect postmodern vehicle” (H u t c h e o n , 
L., 2002 : 116) which combines the features of high and popular art and 
can be read in the context of creativity or technology. Photography also 
appears to bear resemblance to narrative fiction because, as Annette Kuhn 
has it, they both “constitute a highly coded discourse” (Quoted in: H u t c h ­
e o n , L., 2002 : 21), and both simultaneously record and transform reali­
ty. As a postmodern device, photography points to “a plurality of selves” 
(H a v e r t y  Ru g g , L., 1997 : 13); rather than operates as a representation of 
a coherent subject ( “not only this image but this one, this one, and that 
one are the [subject of the photograph]” (H a v e r t y  Ru g g , L., 1997 : 13)).
Even though photographs indicate the presence of the body and prove 
that the body was there —  at a particular time, in a particular place — 
they also inevitably evidence the absence of this body (right now, on the 
surface of the picture). In photographs, one sees oneself “ framed and 
shot” (H a v e r t y  Ru g g , L., 1997 : 18); the body is “stilled and silenced, its 
performance arrested, its dynamic mobility denied” (Be s t , V, 1997 : 175). 
Photography “imprisons, arrests, and falsifies time; [...] it is submission 
to and an assault upon reality” (H u t c h e o n , L., 2002 : 118). Because of the 
fact that “photography arrests the flow of life and creates memorials to 
moments, persons, and objects, the medium was from the first associated 
with death” (H a v e r t y  Ru g g , L., 1997 : 18). It is the objectification of the 
photographed body, as well as “the creation of the body as a passive image 
that cannot resist construction from the viewing subject” (H a v e r t y  Ru g g , 
L., 1997 : 16) that have been of interest to numerous feminist critics.
It was Simone de Beauvoir who — founding her argument upon the­
ories of Jean-Paul Sartre — famously identified (generic) Woman as the 
Other, necessarily and unavoidably objectified by (generic) Man’s gaze. 
Woman’s otherness presupposes both her inferiority and visibility: she is 
(perceived as) her body and “she must pretend to be an object, and a fas­
cinating one” (Be a u v o ir , S., 1952 : 380). Whereas Man gains the status 
of the “bearer of the look” (M u l v e y , L., 1990 : 62), Woman is a body, an 
image, and an objet d ’art. She is “the ivory carving or mud replica, an icon 
or doll, but she is not the sculptor” (Gu b a r , S., 1985 : 293). Since in a pho-
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tograph the body of the subject is objectified and open to view, “the pho­
tograph offers a typically gendered viewing position for a mastering mas­
culine gaze over a passive and silenced feminine image” (Be s t , V, 1997 : 
175). “It is no coincidence, therefore,” as Annette Kuhn asserts,
[...] that in many highly socially visible (and profitable) forms of photo­
graphy women dominate the image. Where photography takes women as 
its subject matter, it also constructs ‘woman’ as a set o f meanings which 
then enter cultural and economic circulation on their own account.
Quoted in: Hu t c h e o n , L., 2002 : 21— 22
The glass coffin in which the perfect, ultimately passive and intact 
body of Snow White is exhibited for everyone to see, serves, accordingly, 
as a fitting metaphor of a photographic frame. In her transparent coffin, 
Snow White (serving as a paragon of docile femininity) is degraded to the 
position of a beautiful, erotic object, and is, so to speak, not herself.
Taking a photograph of someone has also long been perceived as an 
act of violation and appropriation — once it is taken (and, therefore, once 
a part of me is taken), it ceases to be in the exclusive possession of the 
photographed. Because of the fact that photographs tend to be perceived 
as “most intimate expressions of ourselves” (Ha v e r t y  Ru g g , L., 1997 : 4), 
in many literary works photography is depicted as an art which can be 
particularly threatening. In Margaret Atwood’s The Edible Woman, for in­
stance, Peter, the fiancé of the main protagonist (Marian), is both a keen 
hunter and a keen photographer and takes equal pleasure in both ways of 
shooting. When Peter attempts to take a photograph of Marian and aims 
at her with his camera, the woman feels like an animal facing a barrel: 
“ [...] her body [freezes, goes] rigid. She [can’t] move, she [can’t] even move 
the muscles of her face as she [stands and stares] into the round glass lens 
pointing towards her [...]” (At w o o d , M., 1969 : 242). Even though she tries 
to convince herself that “it ’s just a camera” (At w o o d , M., 1969 : 242) and, 
therefore, apparently nothing to fear, she feels terrified at the ominous 
usurpation (which she barely and accidentally manages to escape). Simi­
larly, the heroine of Michael Faber’s The Crimson Petal and the White — 
a young prostitute named Sugar — fears photographs; this time, however, 
the menace springs from their permanence:
Whatever violations she routinely submits to in the privacy of her bed­
room, they vanish the moment they’re over, half-forgotten with the drying 
of sweat. But to be chemically fixed in time and passed hand to hand fo­
rever: that is a nakedness which can never be clothed again.
Fa b e r , M., 2002 : 40— 41
In her short story, Shields avoids such direct references to photogra­
phy, as well as to the potential dangers photography carries. Instead, she 
focuses on images which subvert photographic fixedness and relate to 
movement and transgression. In the subsequent part of my article, I will 
show how Shields’s text transcends the norms of linearity and coherence, 
and, at the same time, how it problematizes the theory of mimetic repre­
sentation, both in reference to photography and to language.
Even though Carol Shields’s short story brings into question the nature 
of representations, its fragmented form mirrors the constant movement of 
the protagonist. For instance, the narrative immediately starts with one 
of the scenes and not with the proper introduction of its heroine. Instead of 
proceeding in a linear, chronological manner, the text unexpectedly shifts 
from the past to the present, in order to end in the past. The fragment­
ed biography corresponds with the concept of fragmented memory, and 
draws one’s attention as much to the scenes described as to the gaps be­
tween them. Photographs, which the scenes resemble, refer to very spe­
cific moments in time and fail to portray the continuity of Frances’s ex­
perience: mostly, as the narrator asserts, they only point to themselves.
Although Shields does not refer to photography straightforwardly, 
some of the scenes presented in her short story contain images which re­
late to photographic fixedness, its deathly qualities and immobility it im­
poses upon its subjects. The first of these images is one of the mirror 
which belonged to Frances’s grandmother and, after her death, was hand­
ed over to the protagonist. Importantly, the detailed description of the 
looking-glass — and of Frances’s attraction to it — focuses on its wood­
en frame on which “leaves, vines, flowers and fruit are shallowly carved” 
(Sh ie l d s , C., 1990 : 647) and not on what and how it reflects. The carv­
ing on the frame “might be described as primitive —  and this is exact­
ly why Frances loves it, being drawn to those things that are incomplete 
or in some way flawed” (Sh ie l d s , C., 1990 : 647). Mesmerized, Frances 
spends many an hour in front of the mirror, admiring the imperfections 
of the frame. Her fascination is mistaken for narcissistic enchantment 
with her own reflection, and Frances is accused of vanity. As long as she 
remains a child, however, Frances remains thoroughly indifferent to her 
own image. Although seeing the mirror for the first time marks a crucial 
moment in Frances’s childhood —  “the mirror is the first thing she re­
members seeing, really seeing, as a child” (Sh ie l d s , C., 1990 : 647) — her 
experience is a parody of Lacanian mirror-stage for she is only interested 
in this part of the looking-glass which does not m irror anything. In oth­
er words, she is not taken in by misrepresentations; rather, her fascina­
tion with the richness, complexity and deformities of the carving, points 
to her inherent conviction that appearances are deceptive.
The mirror is passed to Frances after her grandmother’s death. Frances 
does not attend the funeral itself but is taken “to the funeral home to bid 
goodbye to her grandmother’s body” (Sh ie l d s , C., 1990 : 647). Like Snow 
White, the grandmother is framed by the edging of the coffin, “her pow­
dered face pulled tight as though with a drawstring into a sort of grimace” 
(Sh ie l d s , C., 1990 : 647—648). It is this artificial stillness of the woman’s 
body that pushes Frances to her first transgression: she touches “her grand­
mother’s lips with the middle finger of her right hand” (Sh ie l d s , C., 1990 : 
648). Even though “the lips [do] not turn to dust” and feel like “the side of 
a rubber ball,” Frances “grows rich with disgust” (Sh ie l d s , C., 1990 : 648). 
“Later, she would look at her finger and say to herself, ‘This finger has 
touched dead lips’” (Sh ie l d s , C., 1990 : 648). Although the powdered sur­
face of her dead grandmother’s skin appears to demarcate a clean boundary 
of the dead body, Frances recognizes the illusory character of the border­
line and is repulsed and enthralled with what the surface covers. Frances 
sees the dead body as grotesque and abject; it is the body which is made 
up to look like a corporeal whole, but, in fact, it is in the process of decom­
posing and is open to transformations. Unstable and repugnant, the dead 
body is also contagious and some of its in-betweenness is transferred onto 
Frances’s finger which from then on is sentenced to violate bodily taboos:
With the same middle finger she later touched the gelatinous top of a gold­
fish swimming in a little glass bowl at school. She touched the raised mole 
on the back o f her father’s white neck. Shuddering, she touched horse 
turds in the back lane, and she touched her own urine springing on to 
the grass as she squatted behind the snowball bush by the fence.
Sh i e l d s , C., 1990 : 648
The bodily transgressions bring Frances back in front of the mirror. 
This time, she focuses on the glass which, however, instead of forming 
a smooth surface that faithfully reflects reality, is “beveled all the way 
round” (Sh ie l d s , C., 1990 : 648). Frances habitually “ [lines] up her round 
face so that the beveled edge [splits] it precisely in two” and once writes 
in her diary that “Life is like looking into a beveled mirror” (Sh ie l d s , C., 
1990 : 648). Next day, however, “she [crosses] it out and, peering into the 
mirror, [sticks] out her tongue and [makes] a face” (Sh ie l d s , C., 1990 : 
648). Clearly, the scenes described above point to Frances’s awareness of 
the capricious nature of mirror images: mirrors reflect reality in a high­
ly suspicious manner and bring attention to fragmentation and prolifera­
tion of the self. Accordingly, in Frances’s view, representations are not to 
be trusted as true; rather, they are to be critically studied, de-composed, 
deconstructed, played with, and mocked.
The passivity of the grandmother’s body, confined to the photograph­
ic frame, is juxtaposed with the series of actions performed by Frances. 
Another scene built upon the same contrast mentions the protagonist’s 
neighbor, Louise Shaw, who has been asleep for ten years. When Louise’s 
mother tells Frances how lively the girl used to be before she fell into coma 
— “forever running or skipping rope or throwing a ball up against the side 
of the garage” — Frances feels obligated to the woman and “whenever she 
[sees Mrs. Shaw] she [makes] her body speed up and whirl on grass or do 
cartwheels” (Sh ie l d s , C., 1990 : 651). The physical activity evolves into 
Frances’s fondness of basketball — in time, “she [becomes] obsessed with 
doing free throws” (Sh ie l d s , C., 1990 : 652). Importantly, by means of be­
coming “the queen of free throws,” Frances takes over the boys’ realm of 
“the back lane” — the space “between board fences, garbage cans, garage 
doors and stands of tough weeds” (Sh ie l d s , C., 1990 : 652). The back lane 
is where Frances learns to swear and to kiss boys, and where her body 
becomes “newly nimble and strong” (Sh ie l d s , C., 1990 : 652). It is also 
where she experiences her first private victory (one morning “she [throws] 
twenty-seven perfect free throws before missing” (Sh ie l d s , C., 1990 : 651)) 
thanks to which she “ [knows] for the first time the incalculable reward of 
self-possession” (Sh ie l d s , C., 1990 : 652). What becomes evident in these 
scenes is that by means of her constant movement Frances transcends the 
frame established as appropriate for the feminine body. In other words, 
she identifies herself through her actions, rather than is gazed at by oth­
ers, contemplated, and judged on the basis of her looks.
Other scenes related to transgression spring from an important process 
through which Frances attempts to characterize her relationship with her­
self and the world. It is learning to read, which for Frances is “like falling 
into a mystery deeper than the mystery of airwaves or the halo around 
the head of the baby Jesus” (Sh ie l d s , C., 1990 : 650). Frances finds lan­
guage to be a problematic structure:
Deliberately she [makes] herself stumble and falter over the words in her 
first books, trying to hold back the rush o f revelation. She [sees] other 
children being matter-of-fact and methodical, puzzling over vowels and 
consonants and sounding out words as though they were dimes and nic­
kels that had to be extracted from the slot o f a bank. She [feels] suffused 
with light and often [skips] or [hops] or [runs] wildly to keep herself from 
flying apart. Her delirium, her failure to ingest books calmly, [makes] her 
suspect there [is] something wrong with her or else with the world [...].
Sh i e l d s , C., 1990 : 650
What seems to make Frances uneasy about reading is the discontinuity 
between the word and the “revelation” of understanding its meaning. 
Whereas other children do not see the discrepancy, Frances grows feverish 
over the words which represent but never touch the real world. Frances’s 
recognition of the fact that language is artificial and that it forms the slip­
pery ground upon which she stumbles and falters, poses a threat of “ fly­
ing apart” — or of the de-construction — of her self.
Moreover, her distrust in language translates into Frances’s skepti­
cism towards the school librarian —  Miss Mayes —  and the woman’s 
claim that “a good book will never let you down” (Sh ie l d s , C., 1990 : 650). 
Frances remains indifferent to Miss Mayes’ account of the apparent won­
ders books can engender (“Books could take you on magic journeys; books 
could teach you where the rain came from or how things used to be in 
the olden days. A  person who truly loved books need never feel alone” 
(Sh ie l d s , C., 1990 : 650—651)). However, she is thoroughly thrilled with 
the list of shameful things people do to books, and particularly with one of 
the enumerated mischiefs: a strip of bacon was once “wrongly, criminally 
inserted between fresh clean pages” (Sh ie l d s , C., 1990 : 651). As Frances 
experiences reading in terms of (semi-religious) revelation, the strip of ba­
con, by means of which the crime against books is accomplished, becomes 
“a porky abomination [whose] ends [...] flop out obscenely” (Sh ie l d s , C., 
1990 : 651). However, the girl finds the way in which the sin was commit­
ted absolutely thrilling:
Someone, someone who lived in the same school district, had had the auda­
city, the imagination, to mark the pages o f a book with a strip of bacon. 
The existence of this person and his outrageous act penetrated the fever 
that had come over her since she’d learned to read, and she began to look 
around again and see what the world had to offer.
Sh i e l d s , C., 1990 : 651
Frances is cured by this creative transgression against language as 
a system of representation; the fact that you can sabotage the seeming­
ly sacred laws guarding the process of reading brings her enormous re­
lief. Consequently, when Frances herself starts working in the university 
library (while, at the same time, she studies languages), she invents her 
own rebellious prank that she — together with a friend named Ursula — 
starts every day with. Namely, before anyone else comes in, the two girls 
“ [gallop] at top speed through the reference room, the periodical room, 
the reading room, up and down the rows of stacks, filling that stilled air 
with what could only be called primal screams” (Sh ie l d s , C., 1990 : 653). 
The “exquisite pleasure” of the run escapes rationalization: Frances “ [is]
in rebellion against nothing she [knows] o f” (Sh ie l d s , C., 1990 : 653). 
The scene again juxtaposes stillness (of books and air) with the energy of 
movement and, most importantly, the kind of organic expression that pre­
cedes language. The “primal screams” mark Frances’s momentary return 
to a pre-linguistic sphere in which — indeed — one knows of nothing.
As Shields’s text can be seen as a series of photographs converted into 
text, the short story appears to form the space in which the apparent bor­
ders between photography and fiction disappear. The selected scenes I dis­
cussed above, point to both photographic images and language as “con­
structions, manipulable and manipulative, masquerading as fact” (H a v e r t y  
Ru g g , L., 1997 : 1). The biographical subject — Frances — is de-centered, 
multiple and “divided against [herself] in the act of observing [reading the 
world] and being [in the world]” (H a v e r t y  Ru g g , L., 1997 : 2). Simulta­
neously, however, the use of the photographic metaphor — the metaphor 
for history and memory (no matter how unreliable and fragmented) — 
points to the pursuit of “the presence of an integrated, authorial self, lo­
cated in a body, a place, and a time” (H a v e r t y  Ru g g , L., 1997 : 2). Even 
though the pursuit takes place within photographic/verbal structures, 
Frances only comes in touch with herself through transcending these 
structures, in numerous acts of transgression.
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